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ABSTRACT
Even well managed emerging market economies are exposed to significant external risk, the bulk
of which is financial. At a moment's notice, these economies may be required to reverse the capital
inflows that have supported the preceding boom. While capital flows crises are sudden nonlinear
events (sudden stops), their likelihood fluctuates over time. The question we address in the paper is
how should a country react to these fluctuations. Depending on the hedging possibilities the country
faces, the options range from pure self-insurance to hedging the sudden stop jump itself. In between,
there is the more likely possibility to hedge the smoother fluctuations in the likelihood of sudden
stops. The main contribution of the paper is to provide an analytically and empirically tractable
model that allows us to characterize and quantify optimal contingent liability management in a
variety of scenarios. We show, with a concrete example, that the gains from contingent liability














panageas@wharton.upenn.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Even well managed emerging market economies are subject to an occasional “sudden stop” of net
capital inﬂows. That is, at a moment’s notice these economies may be required to reverse the
capital inﬂows that supported the preceding boom.
The deep contractions triggered by this sudden tightening of external ﬁnancial constraints have
great costs for these economies, and therefore represent one of the main macroeconomic policy-
problems for emerging market economies. There are many domestic and external factors behind
these sudden stops in net capital inﬂows. While there is substantial agreement on the kind of policy
adjustments that reduce domestic risks, there is less consensus on what are the adequate external
liability management strategies to deal with external shocks. In Caballero and Panageas (2005)
we analyzed reserves accumulation and hedging mechanisms to soften the impact of sudden stops
once these take place. In this paper we focus on a diﬀerent aspect of the problem: We argue that
there are substantial ﬂuctuations in the likelihood of a sudden stop, and that in many instances
these ﬂuctuations are correlated with persistent external variables which oﬀer hedging possibilities
free of moral hazard or (emerging market speciﬁc) informational concerns (see Sections 5 and 6 for
evidence).
The main technical contribution of the paper is a model that is stylized enough to allow exten-
sive analytical characterization, but is also ﬂexible and realistic enough to generate quantitative
guidance. The model has two central features: First is the sudden stop, which we characterize as
a probabilistic event that, once triggered, requires the country to reduce the pace of external (net)
borrowing signiﬁcantly. This speciﬁcation of sudden stops captures well policymakers’ concerns not
only with the stock of external liabilities but also with the size of current account deﬁcits (a ﬂow
variable). Second is a signal, which describes the likelihood of sudden stop at each point in time.
We characterize the impact of changes in this signal on optimal precautionary savings, and the
role of diﬀerent hedging opportunities in reducing the extent of ﬂuctuations due to precautionary
actions and the direct cost of sudden stops.
On one extreme, if the country has no access to hedging instruments, the only tool at hand
is a sort of precautionary contraction. As external indicators of the likelihood of a sudden stop
worsen, the country slows down the pace of borrowing. Of course, in reality many countries choose
2to ignore these signals and experience deeper contractions once sudden stops take place. Others are
excessively prudent, and tighten monetary and ﬁscal policy beyond what many see as reasonable.
The ﬁrst of our goals in this paper is normative, and it is to take a step in the direction of oﬀering
an empirically based metric to evaluate how much prudence is reasonable.
On the other extreme is the case where the country can hedge both the (jump) sudden stop
directly and (diﬀusive) ﬂuctuations in the price of such hedge as the signal ﬂuctuates. In this case
the country has maximal insurance. However, since our constraint is directly on the current account
deﬁcits, such insurance does not remove sudden stop entirely but only reduces the country’s level
of external liabilities at the onset of the sudden stop, at minimal cost. What it does do, is to
remove the need for precautionary contractions and it limits the extent of a sudden stop to a level
that removes jumps in the value of a marginal dollar at the time of the sudden stop (since the
reduction in external liabilities raises utility in the post-sudden stop stage enough to compensate
for the welfare loss from reduced consumption during the sudden stop).
In an intermediate range, is the more feasible scenario where the jump cannot be hedged but
smooth diﬀusive hedging is available. In this case the country still can remove the bulk of precau-
tionary contractions and reduce the cost of sudden stops, but it remains exposed to the realization
of the latter. One of the quantitative contributions of the paper is to show that this type of hedging
can go a long way in reducing the overall costs of living in a sudden stop prone environment.
The case of Chile, a prudent emerging market economy, provides a useful framework of reference.
Chile’s business cycle is highly correlated with the price of copper, its main export good; so much
so that this price has become a signal of aggregate Chilean conditions to (foreign and domestic)
investors and policymakers alike. As a result of the many internal and external reactions to this
signal, the decline in Chilean economic activity when the price of copper falls sharply is many times
larger than the annuity value of the wealth eﬀect of the price decline. This contrasts with the
scenario in Australia, a developed economy not exposed to the possibility of a sudden stop, where
similar terms-of-trade shocks are fully absorbed by the current account, with almost no impact on
domestic activity and consumption.1 Chile is a natural candidate for the type of hedging strategies
we propose.
We do not attempt to explain why international ﬁnancial markets treat Chile and Australia
1See , e.g., Caballero (2001).
3so diﬀerently, or even why the signal for the sudden stops should be so correlated with the price
of copper. Instead, we take the “sudden stops” feature as a description of the environment and
characterize the optimal risk management strategy under diﬀerent assumptions about imperfections
in hedging markets.2
We estimate Chile’s probability of facing a sudden stop as a function of the price of copper and
calibrate the parameters to match observed consumption ﬂuctuations. We then describe diﬀerent
hedging strategies and their impact on the volatility and levels of consumption. We start by
showing that in the absence of hedging instruments, Chile should exhibit a signiﬁcant precautionary
business cycle. For example, more than half of the deep reduction in the current account deﬁcit in
Chile during the 1998/99 crisis can be accounted for by the optimal response to the fear (not the
realization) of a sudden stop.
We then go on to show the beneﬁt of adding contingencies to liability management. For a wide
range of scenarios the gains associated with hedging are equivalent to reducing Chile’s net external
liabilities (of about 50 percent of GDP) by a third. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the required risk premia
to justify for a country like Chile to not adopt an active hedging strategy exceeds 800 basis points
for the simplest strategies and several thousand basis points for richer ones.3
Of course the beneﬁts of these strategies are not limited to the case of Chile, which is only
illustrative. As another example, we show for a panel of emerging markets that the likelihood of
sudden stops – as identiﬁed by Calvo et al (2005)– exhibits large time variation, and that the
latter is strongly correlated with lagged US high yield spreads.
2We focus on the aggregate ﬁnancial problem vis-a-vis the rest of the world, in an environment where domestic
policy is managed optimally and decentralization is not a source of problems. Needless to say, these assumptions
seldom hold in practice. Such failures compound the problems we deal with in this paper by exacerbating the country’s
exposure to sudden stops. See, e.g., Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003) and Tirole (2002) for articles dealing
with decentralization problems. The literature on government’s excesses is very extensive. See, e.g., Burnside et al
(2003) for a recent incarnation.
3In his Nobel lecture, Robert Merton (1998) highlights the enormous savings than can be obtained by designing
adequate derivatives and other contracting technologies to deal with risk management. He also argues that emerging-
market economies stand to gain the most. Our ﬁndings in this paper fully support his views. See also, e.g., Krugman
(1988), Froot, Scharfstein, Stein (1989), Haldane (1999), Caballero (2001), for articles advocating commodity index-
ation of emerging markets debt. The contribution of this paper relative to that literature is to oﬀer a quantitative
framework and to link the hedging need not to commodities per se, but to the signal aspect of much costlier ﬁnancial
constraints.
4In section 2 we describe the environment and characterize the optimization problem once a
sudden stop has been triggered – this provides the boundary conditions for the “precautioning
phase.” In section 3 we study the phase that precedes a sudden stop when the country self-insures.
The main goal of this section is to characterize precautionary contractions. Section 4 describes
aggregate hedging strategies under diﬀerent degree of imperfections in these markets. Section 5
illustrates our results through an application to the case of Chile. Along the way, we outline
an econometric approach to gauging the likelihood of a sudden stop and its correlation with an
underlying signal. Section 6 provides empirical evidence for a panel of emerging market economies
on the large time variation in the likelihood of sudden stops and its correlation with persistent (and
exogenous) global indices. Section 7 concludes and is followed by an extensive technical appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Intertemporal smoothing implies that emerging economies typically experience substantial needs for
external borrowing from abroad. For a variety of reasons that we do not model here, this dependence
on borrowing is a source of fragility. The sudden tightening of ﬁnancial constraints generates large
drops in consumption. In this section we formalize such environment and characterize the value
function of consumers once a sudden stop has occurred. This serves as a boundary condition for
the pre-sudden stop problem faced by the country, which is our main concern in this paper.
2.1 Endowment and Preferences
Let the endowment grow at some constant rate, g>0, during 0 ≤ t<∞:
yt = y0egt. (1)
This speciﬁcation of the income process excludes feedback eﬀects from aggregate demand to output
and from output to sudden stops (although we recover some of the latter channel in the signal
process, see below), and hence underestimate the impact of the phenomenon we study. Nonetheless
we adopt it because its simplicity allows us to isolate the direct eﬀect of sudden stops more cleanly.
Reﬂecting emerging markets’ net debtor position, the country starts with ﬁnancial wealth,











where r denotes the riskless interest rate and it exceeds the rate of growth of the endowment, r>g .
Let ct and c∗
t represent date t consumption and “excess” consumption, respectively, with:
c∗
t ≡ ct − κyt, 0 ≤ κ<1.














The parameters δ and γ are the discount rate and risk aversion coeﬃcient, respectively. For
simplicity, we assume r = δ throughout. The functional form of the utility function captures an
external habit formation, with a habit level that is increasing at the rate of the country’s growth
rate. The habit term plays two roles: First, it raises the eﬀective risk aversion of the country
in a manner similar to Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and thus brings the demand for hedging
to realistic magnitudes. Second, it introduces a trend in consumption which allows us to reduce
borrowing demand to reasonable levels without introducing overlapping generations or gaps between
the interest and discount rates which would complicate the analysis.4
A frictionless benchmark
It is instructive to pause and study the solution of problem (2) subject to a standard intertem-
poral budget constraint (and absent a sudden stop constraint):




4Accordingly, this type of utility function implies that the indebtedness of the country at any point in time will







6with y∗ ≡ (1 − κ)y.






































Moreover, for any level of Xt
yt above its limit value, the ratio Xt
y∗
t decreases monotonically to
− 1
r−g.
This case serves as a frictionless benchmark in what follows.
2.1.1 Sudden Stops
We place no limits on the country’s borrowing ability up to the stochastic time τ.A tt h i st i m e ,t h e
country faces a “sudden stop.” We do not model the informational or contractual factors behind
this constraint, or the complex bargaining and restructuring process that follows once the sudden
stop is triggered. Since our goal is to produce a quantitative assessment of the hedging aspects of
the problem, we look for a realistic and fairly robust (across models) constraint. For this, we simply
model the sudden stop as a temporary and severe constraint on the rate of external borrowing. In
particular, since the “natural” aggregator of a country’s total wealth is the net present value of its






We assume that at time τ, ﬁnancial markets require the country to increase its total resources by
ζ,
egT ≤ ζ ≤ erT























remains constant at all times. It is then straightforward to
show that this constraint can be expressed as a constraint on the maximum allowable amount of












Higher levels of ζ make the constraint tighter. At its minimum, ζ = egT, the constraint literally








Finally, it is interesting to note that one can think of (6) as a constraint on the minimum
balance-of-trade surpluses the country has to accumulate over the next T periods. To see this,





t)dt = e−rTXτ+T − Xτ









e−(r−g)T − (1 − ζe−rT)Xτ.
This gives us the constraint in terms of the balance-of-trade surpluses required from a country
that is faced with a sudden stop. These required surpluses rise with the country’s endowment, with
ζ, and with the level of debt at the time of the sudden stop (recall that Xτ < 0 when the country
is a net debtor).
That is, we have arrived to a ﬂow constraint rather than to a conventional stock constraint.
This speciﬁcation not only facilitates our analysis but also captures well policymakers’ concerns
with current account deﬁcits regardless of the level of external indebtedness. In practice we observe
5Even for the ζ = e
gT case the constraint we consider is binding at the time of the sudden stop. This follows from
the fact that the debt/gdp ratio is always growing for an unconstrained country as we showed above.
8a wide array of debt-to-gdp ratios but warnings emerge quickly as soon as current account deﬁcits
(a ﬂow) crosses certain thresholds. There is at least one good reason for this concern with ﬂows
above and beyond stocks: while there is always some space for stock renegotiation, ﬁnancing new
ﬂows is much harder to obtain during distress.
A sw em e n t i o n e da b o v e . n o t et h a tw h i l et h ec o n s t r a i n ti so nt h eﬂows, stocks do matter. A
higher debt-to-gdp ratio at the outset of the sudden stop requires a larger consumption sacriﬁce
s i n c ed e b t - s e r v i c i n gi sm o r ee x p e n s i v e . T h i si sk e yf o ro u rr e s u l t sb e l o w ,a st h em a i nr e a s o nf o r
countries to slow down in anticipation of a sudden stop is to reduce this debt-burden cost. Note
also that as ζ goes to its upper limit erT,t h ee ﬀectiveness of the changes in the initial stock of debt
in aﬀecting the constraint is diminished but excess consumption during the sudden stop approaches
zero, and hence the value of even small contributions to the relaxation of the constraint have great
value. If γ>1, which we assume throughout, the latter eﬀect dominates and the incentive to
adjust debt before a sudden stop rises with ζ.
2.2 The Sudden Stop Value Function (A Boundary Condition)
We solve the optimization problem in three steps. Starting backwards, we ﬁrst solve for the post-
crisis period, then for the sudden-stop period, and ﬁnally for the period preceding the sudden stop.
In this section we summarize the results of the ﬁrst two steps. The goal of these is to ﬁnd the value
function at the time of the sudden stop, V SS(Xτ,y τ), which we then use to ﬁnd the solution of the
optimization and hedging problems before the crisis takes place. Since our concern in this paper is
with the latter phase, we assume that there is only one sudden stop, which simpliﬁes the analysis
without sacriﬁcing much insight.
Lemma 1 Let V SS(Xτ,y∗
τ) denote the value function at the the time of the sudden stop and set



















and the constant K is
K =( 1− e−rT)γ(1 − e−rTζ)1−γ + e−rTζ1−γ, (8)
9such that
K = K(ζ) with K > 1;K0 > 0. (9)
We leave the proof for the appendix. Note that the value function does not depend on Xτ and








observation will prove convenient later on, because it will allow us to reduce the dimensionality of
the dynamic programming problem. Moreover, up to the constant K, we have arrived at a value
function that is identical to the one in the problem without sudden stops. Lastly, for γ>1,w h i c h
we assume throughout, K>1 and increases with ζ.6
While the particular simplicity of our formulae is due to stylized assumptions, the basic message
is more general. The model also can be understood as an approximation to a potentially more
complicated speciﬁcation of constraints that result in higher marginal disutility of debt in the event
of a crisis.
3 Precautionary Contractions
Let us now address our main concern and begin to characterize the country’s problem prior to
the sudden-stop phase. If there are no hedging instruments, the country’s only mechanism for
reducing the cost of a sudden stop is to cut consumption and borrowing before the sudden stop
takes place. We show that if sudden stops are somewhat predictable, the amount of self-insurance
varies over time. This time varying precautionary savings implies that when the signal of a sudden
stop deteriorates, the country falls into a sort of “precautionary contraction.” That is, into a sharp
reduction in consumption to limit the cost of the potential sudden stop.
Let st represent a publicly observed sudden stop signal that follows a diﬀusion process:
dst = µdt + σdBt.
6Observe that for γ>1 the function
Z1−γ
1−γ is negative for all Z>0.T h u s K>1 reﬂects that the constrained
value function is lower than the continuation value function for the unconstrained problem. The reason we need
γ>1 is that the ﬂow aspect of the constraint implies that having a higher Xτ does not relax the constraint one for
one, because the lender does not reduce its demands by the same amount during the sudden stop. When γ is below
one, this eﬀect is strong enough to discourage saving for the crisis.
10This signal is imperfectly related to the sudden stop process. Concretely, the stochastic time τ
depends on the realization of a stochastic jump process, the intensity of which is given by
λt =e x p ( α0 − α1st); α1 ≥ 0.

















τ =i n f{t ∈ (0,∞):
Z t
0
λ(su)du < z},λ (st)=eα0−α1st,z ∼ exp(1). (11)
and the evolution of (Xt,s t,y t) is given by:






dst = µdt + σdBt. (14)
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for an appropriate function b(st). The function b(st) captures all the economics of the problem and
we study it in more detail in what follows.
113.1 Precautionary Savings
Assume ﬁrst that sudden stops are totally unpredictable, α1 =0 ,s ot h a tλt =e x p ( α0)=λ. Since
in this case b(s) is no longer a function of the signal s, replacing the function V in the HJB equation




















b captures the jump in the value function once the country enters into a sudden stop. Let us
relegate the proof of the following lemma to the appendix:

















This result —combined with Lemma 2— demonstrates the presence of precautionary savings: b is
larger than 1
r,y e ts m a l l e rt h a nb. Hence consumption is less than what it would be in the absence
of sudden stops. Yet, it is more than what it would be if the country experienced a sudden stop.
This reﬂects the country’s desire to accumulate extra savings (compared to the no-sudden stop
case) in order to smooth out the eﬀects of these extreme events.

















That is, the (excess) consumption process prior to a sudden stop has an upward drift: This in
turn reﬂects a precautionary savings demand attributable to the uncertainty generated by the risk
of a sudden stop taking place in the next instant. But, because this probability is not correlated
with the signal s, there are no precautionary contractions. In this case, the pattern of saving for
self-insurance is not a source of business cycles.
123.2 Time Varying Precautionary Savings
Let us now return to the general case, where α1 > 0. After a few simpliﬁcations, substituting
the function V of equation (17) into the HJB equation (15) shows that b(s) satisﬁes the following
ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE):





















The boundary conditions reﬂect the facts that as the signal becomes extremely positive, the
problem approximates the frictionless (no sudden stops) benchmark, while when the signal is ex-
tremely negative, the problem converges to that at the sudden stop time. Let
b∗ =l i m
s→∞b(s). (21)
b∗ =l i m
s→−∞
b(s). (22)




b∗ = K1/γ 1
r
.
W ec a ne a s i l yo b t a i nt h es o l u t i o nt ot h eo r d i n a r yd i ﬀerential equation (20) numerically. We
plot this function (multiplied by r) in the top subplot of Figure 1. The function b(s) is decreasing
with respect to s. As the signal deteriorates, this function rises rapidly, reﬂecting the increasing
marginal value of wealth when a sudden stop is likely in the near future.
This setup allows for an explicit characterization of the optimal consumption policy in feedback












The eﬀect of the signal can be seen clearly in this expression. As s rises, b(s) falls toward
its frictionless limit and hence consumption increases for any given level of wealth. Conversely,
when the signal worsens, consumption falls for any given level of wealth causing a precautionary
contraction.
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Figure 1: The top subplot depicts rb(st) for a wide range of values of st normalized by its (yearly)
standard deviation. Similarly, the bottom panel focuses on a more narrow range of values for st
(normalized by the yearly standard deviation), and plots rb(st) (dashed line - measured on the left
axis) and the hazard rate (solid line - measured on the right axis).
14Finally, applying Ito’s lemma to the right hand side of (23) using (20), (3), and (1) we obtain





































, which we also found in the
case α1 =0 , and captures precautioning against the Poisson jump event that can occur at any
time. However, now there are two additional terms associated with the sensitivity of the likelihood
of a sudden stop to the signal. For the reasons explained above, bs
b is strictly negative, so that a
deteriorating signal increases the need to accumulate resources and accordingly makes consumption
respond more to a one-standard-deviation increase in the signal by a factor of −bs
b σ.T h e r e i s
also an extra precautionary savings term in the drift in response to the additional uncertainty in
consumption created by precautionary contractions. In the application section of the paper we
quantify these eﬀects.
3.3 Ignoring time varying hazards
Before we turn to hedging, we shall develop a framework to measure the costs associated with
simply ignoring time-variation in the hazard rate. In order to quantify these costs, assume that
a country chose to ignore time variation in the hazard rate and determines its policies as if the










where d would be a solution to equation (18) with λ replacing λ. If the hazard rate is truly time
varying, this policy will be clearly suboptimal. We can evaluate the expected utility V sub associated
with this suboptimal policy by plugging it (instead of the optimal policy (23)) into the Bellman







V SS − V sub
´
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X (rXt + y∗








An informed guess about the solution to this equation is:













































In the application section we solve this diﬀerential equation numerically and evaluate the welfare
loses of ignoring time variation in the hazard rate.
4A g g r e g a t e H e d g i n g
Precautionary savings and contractions are costly and imperfect self-insurance mechanisms for
smoothing the impact of a sudden stop. In this section we enlarge the options of the country and
allow it to hedge using insurance contracts and derivatives. Of course, the eﬀectiveness of the
hedging strategy depends on the contracts and instruments that are available to the country, and
how accurate the crisis-signal is. In this section we provide a framework to explore a variety of
scenarios in a uniﬁed framework.
4.1 A uniﬁed model of hedging
There are two fundamental sources of risk in our framework. The ﬁr s tt y p ea r er i s k st h a ta r e
associated with variations in the signal s. Since s follows a diﬀusion process, we shall refer to those
as “diﬀusive” risks. The second source of risks are those that are associated with the actual arrival
of the random sudden stop time τ. We shall refer to this type of risk as “jump” risk. The ability
of the country to mitigate the eﬀects of sudden stops will critically depend on both the availability
of markets to hedge against these risks and the costs of such strategies.
Let us assume that diﬀusive risks can be hedged in futures market. That is, a country can enter
into contracts with payoﬀsg i v e nb y :
dFt
Ft
= φ1dt + σdBt
where φ1 is a risk premium, that could depend on st. If the diﬀusive risks are not associated with
global risks, then φ1 =0and the futures price is a martingale. In the presence of futures contracts,
16the dynamic budget constraint becomes:
dXt =( rXt − c∗
t + y∗
t)dt + πtdFt
where πt denotes the number of futures contracts that the country wishes to purchase. Deﬁning
the portfolio process as pt = πtFt, we obtain the new dynamic budget constraint:
dXt =( rXt − c∗
t + y∗
t + ptφ1)dt + ptσdBt (26)
Let us assume that jump risks are hedged through “insurers” who are willing to enter into an
(instantaneous) contract of duration dt in the following terms: If the country enters into a sudden
stop over the next interval dt, then the insurer pays 1 unit of consumption to the country, else
nothing. In exchange for this contract the country pays an amount equal to λ(st)(1 + φ2)dt to the
insurer per contract purchased. Similar to φ1, the parameter φ2 should be viewed as a markup
or a risk premium. If insurance is actuarially fair, then φ2 =0 . Else the insurer charges φ2 > 0.
Allowing for markets in both diﬀusive and jump risks, the evolution of assets becomes:
dXt =( rXt − c∗
t + y∗
t + ptφ1 − λ(st)(1 + φ2)It)dt + ptσdBt + ItdNt (27)
where Nt is identically equal to 0 and jumps to 1 when the country enters into a sudden stop, and
It denotes the amount of insurance contracts purchased (in units of the numeraire). The dynamic
budget constraint (27) includes equations (26) and (3) as special cases. If we assume away the
presence of insurers, then It =0and (27) reduces to (26). Furthermore, if we assume away the
presence of futures markets to hedge against diﬀusive risk, then (26) becomes (3).
4.2 The general case
Let us solve the country’s problem subject to the dynamic budget constraint (27), and then turn to
study important subcases. If the budget constraint is modiﬁed to (27), then the Bellman equation




















VXXp2 + VXspσ2 + pVXφ1
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t − [r + λ(st)]V
17The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are:
(c∗)
−γ = VX (29)
V SS









The ﬁrst optimality condition is the familiar Euler equation. The second equation captures
the country’s attempt to equate the marginal value of a dollar pre- and post- sudden stop, which
is fully accomplished if φ2 =0 . Finally, the last condition is identical to Merton’s formula. The
optimal portfolio of futures consists of two parts: The ﬁr s tp a r ti sp o s i t i v e( s i n c eVXX < 0,V X > 0)
and captures the willingness to accept some volatility in return for a risk-premium. By contrast, a
simple intuitive argument shows that the second term captures a hedging demand and is negative.
The reason is that the marginal value of wealth will become higher the more likely it becomes
that a sudden stop is imminent. This happens as s decreases and hence VXs < 0. A particularly
interesting case is φ1 =0 , i.e. when the signal is uncorrelated with the world economy. Then p<0,
since only the hedging motive prevails.
































































Plugging back (32) into (28), using the above four equations and performing several simpliﬁcations,
18shows that V satisﬁes (28) if and only if d(st) satisﬁes the equation:













































Equation (36) is a non-linear second order diﬀerential equation which is to be solved under
the boundary conditions (21) and (22). Even though it does not have an analytical solution, we
can still characterize several properties of the solution. Of particular interest is the behavior of
consumption, for which we have:


























Let us now analyze a few special cases to understand the diﬀerent component of the consumption
process.
4.3 No restrictions on hedging
The natural starting point is when φ1 = φ2 =0 . In other words, markets exist for both types of
risks and the risks that threaten the country are diversiﬁable. The following Lemma shows that in
this case pre-sudden stop consumption will be constant:
Proposition 1 If φ1 = φ2 =0 , then
dc∗
t =0 , 0 ≤ t<τ.
This result asserts that consumption will be constant prior to a sudden stop if a country can
hedge perfectly in markets for both diﬀusive and jump risks. This result is hardly surprising. If the
country can costlessly trade in contingent claims, then it will be able to stabilize its consumption
stream pre-sudden stop. Precautionary savings ceases to be necessary as a mitigation mechanism.
19Let us pause and note that both markets need to be costelessly accessible in order to obtain
the above result. This may seem surprising at ﬁrst. Why should there be a need for a market
for diﬀusive risks as long as the country can costelessly contract with insurers on the amounts it
desires upon the arrival of the sudden stop? After all, variations in s are only useful in predicting
the likelihood of a jump, and are otherwise useless. The resolution of this puzzle is that the
cost of insurance is time varying. Since the contracts with the insurers are instantaneous, there
is uncertainty about the terms under which these contracts can be rolled over in the future. If
s decreases, then the actuarially fair insurance will become more costly. Therefore, futures are
needed in order to hedge against such variations in the price of insurance.
To see this, let us momentarily set φ2 =0 , but
φ1 = −γσ2ds
d
In the appendix we show that in this case the (excess) consumption process has the following
properties:
Proposition 2 Assume that φ2 =0and φ1 = −γσ2 ds


















for d(st) that solves (36) with φ2 =0and φ1 = −γσ2 ds
d .
That is, the consumption process is a non-degenarate diﬀusion (in the sense that it has a non-
zero “dB00
t term). This shows that in the presence of time variation in the likelihood of a sudden
stop both markets (for diﬀusive and jump risk) will contribute towards hedging. Neither will be
suﬃcient in isolation.
Let us not return to the case with φ1 = φ2 =0 . An alternative way to arrive at Proposition 1
is to use the martingale methods developed by Cox and Huang (1989) and Karatzas et.al. (1987).
This methodology is particularly attractive when dynamic trading allows one to span all possible
stochastic payoﬀs.

































This is an inherently static problem. Adjoining a lagrange multiplier k to the budget constraint



















There are at least two observations that deserve comment. First, observe that the (excess)
consumption process is equal to a constant for all times between t ≤ u ≤ τ.This is just a restatement
of Proposition 1. Second, observe that the optimal level of ﬁnancial wealth at time τ can be


























Extra insurance needed to cover SS
Since K>1 the second term is clearly positive and it captures the demand for insurance. Com-






















This formula shows that optimal (excess) consumption will be lower in an economy that is exposed










7It is interesting to cross-check that dynamic programming and the martingale methods produce the same answer
for the consumption process. To see this note that the martingale methods in conjunction with (33) imply that d(st)














21The reason is intuitive: Even when all hedging possibilities are unconstrained, the country still has
to pay for such insurance, and hence it will have to cut back consumption somewhat in order to
be able to ﬁnance this insurance. However, this insurance will allow the country to eliminate the
volatility of its consumption process subsequently. An interesting feature of (42) is that it allows






























This formula allows a simple “back of the envelope” computation. Note that Ee−r(τ−t) is the
moment generating function of the random time τ. Accordingly:
Ee−r(τ−t) =1− rE(τ − t)+O(r2)
Ignoring the last term in the above equation, the cost of insurance as a percentage of excess






(1 − rE(τ − t)) (43)
This formula is quite intuitive. It says that the cost of hedging is proportional to the sever-
ity of the sudden stop (as captured by K1/γ) and the constant of proportionality is given by
(1 − rE(τ − t)). Hence, the longer is the expected distance to the sudden stop (say because s is
high) the less is the cost of insurance.
To see that dynamic programming will produce the same answer, note that according to the Bellman equation (36)
and the fact that φ1 = φ2 =0:





































































This is exactly the same expression as the one produced by the martingale approach.
224.4 Restricted insurance
One could reasonably argue that the hedging of jump risks may be infeasible in practice. Insuring
sudden stops directly probably requires to overcome a long list of moral hazard and informational
concerns. One possibility is to do proxy-hedging using exogenous variables, as described by Ca-
ballero and Panageas (2005), but there will always be an important residual that probably can only
be insured (and to a limited amount) by international ﬁnancial institutions rather than by private
markets.
However, if one can ﬁnd tradeable variables (such as the price of copper) that are useful in pre-
dicting the arrival of a sudden stop, then hedging “diﬀusive” risk alone can still provide signiﬁcant
beneﬁts.
The easiest way to see this is to impose the constraint I =0 , but continue to maintain the




γ − 1 (44)
If φ2 is given by this process, then clearly I =0by (34). It is most useful to think of φ2 not as a
risk premium but as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint I =0 . The following
result shows that even in this case the consumption process is less volatile than in Section 3.
Proposition 3 Assume that φ2 is given by (44) so that I =0 . Furthermore assume that φ1 =0 .













where d solves (36) with φ2 given by (44) and φ1 =0 .
A key observation about the above proposition is that the consumption process has no quadratic
variation. This is in contrast to Section 3 where we allowed precautionary savings only (compare
with equation (37)). This means that hedging with futures achieves the goal of mitigating pre-
cautionary contractions, even in the complete absence of markets that insure against the arrival of
sudden stops (jump risk).
Note, however, that relative to the φ2 =0case, the consumption process still has a drift reﬂect-
ing the presence of precautionary savings due to the presence of unhedged jump risk. Moreover,
23there is still (smooth) variation in the consumption rate pre-sudden stop since both λ and d depend
on st.
4.5 Pure Precautionary savings as a special case
In the previous section we postulated equation (44) for φ2 in order to impose the constraint I =0 .
In this section we shall additionally postulate that p =0 , so that the country is excluded from




That is, φ1 is the appropriate “shadow” risk premium that ensures that p =0throughout. The
next proposition shows that under the joint assumptions (44) and (45) we recover the result in
section 3.2 .
Proposition 4 Assume that (44) and (45) hold. Then d(st) s o l v e st h es a m ee q u a t i o na sb(st) in



























which is identical to equation (24).
The value of this proposition is to embed the results in Section 3 in the same framework as the
one that we used in this section and, more importantly, to identify the necessary assumptions on
“shadow” risk premia in order to justify no hedging.
4.6 Discussion
We can now view the results that we have obtained thus far in a uniﬁed framework. In Section 3 we
eliminated every hedging possibility. Therefore, the country was left with precautionary savings as
its sole protection against sudden stops. The country’s consumption pre-sudden stop was aﬀected
by both variations in the hazard rate (diﬀusive risk) and the random arrival of the sudden stop
conditional on the hazard rate (jump risk). At the polar opposite, Section 4.3 allowed for the
24presence of an insurer and a market to hedge against diﬀusive risk. This helped eliminate the
eﬀects of both sources of risk on consumption. Hence consumption pre-sudden stop was constant.
Subsection 4.4 helped demonstrate that even in the absence of an insurer, the presence of hedging
markets can help eliminate the eﬀects of diﬀusive risk on consumption. However, the consumption
process will still be aﬀected by the non-insurability of jump risk which leaves a random drift in the
consumption process.
Importantly, Sections 4.4 and 4.5 helped to demonstrate that the assumptions on the presence or
absence of markets are equivalent to making appropriate assumptions on the prevailing “shadow”
risk premia on these markets. This will facilitate robustness checks after we calculate optimal
hedging strategies.
5 An Illustration: The Case of Chile
In this section we illustrate our main results through an application to the case of Chile. This is a
good case study since Chile is an open economy, with most of its recent business cycle attributable
to capital ﬂows’ volatility. Moreover, the price of copper (its main export) is not only an important
source of income ﬂuctuations but, more importantly for us, it is an excellent indicator of investors
attitude toward Chile. In fact, Caballero (2001) shows that the typical contraction in Chilean
aggregate demand and net capital ﬂows after a sharp decline in the price of copper is many times
larger than the corresponding annuity value of the decline in Chilean wealth due to the drop in
copper prices.
5.1 Calibration
While our purpose here is only illustrative, and hence our search for parameters is rather informal,
we spend some time describing our estimation/calibration of the key function λ(s).
5.1.1 Estimating λ(s)
Sudden stops are severe but rare events, which makes it hard to estimate λ(s) with any precision.
However, we still highlight our procedure because it provides a good starting point for an actual
implementation. Similarly, a key issue is determining the components of the signal, s.G i v e n
25the limited goal of this section, we use only the logarithm of the price of copper. In a true
implementation it also would be worth including some global risk-ﬁnancial indicator, such as the
U.S. high yield spread, the EMBI+ or the VIX (see Section 6 below), and removing slow moving
trends from the price of copper.8
With these caveats behind us, let us describe the reduced-form Markov regime switching model
we use to estimate λ(s). Unlike the standard regime-switching model, ours has time-varying tran-
sition probabilities. Our left-hand side variable is aggregate demand, Yt (which we will proxy with
GDP data but it does not make any diﬀerence for our purpose of identifying the likelihood of a
sudden stop at each point in time) and is generated by the process:
Yt = µ0 +1 {zt=1}µ1 + σztε, ε ∼ N(0,1),µ 1 < 0.
The growth rate of Yt depends on an unobserved regime zt that takes values 0 and 1. When the
value of the regime is 0, the regime is “normal” and growth is just a normal variable with mean µ0
and variance σ2
0. Otherwise, the regime is “abnormal” and growth has a lower mean, µ0 + µ1,a n d
av a r i a n c eσ2
1. The transition matrix between the two states is assumed to be the following:
Pr(zt+1 =0 |zt =0 ,X s,s∈(t,t+1))=e x p −
U t+1
t λ(xu)du = p00 Pr(zt+1 =1 |zt =0 ,X s,s∈(t,t+1))=p01
Pr(zt+1 =0 |zt =1 ,X s,s∈(t,t+1))=p10 Pr(zt+1 =1 |zt =1 ,X s,s∈(t,t+1))=q
where p01 =1− p00, p10 =1− q,a n dXt stands for the regressors that enter the hazard function
(the logarithm of the price of copper in this application).9 For the purpose of estimating λ(s),w e
use annual GDP data starting from 1976 to 1999 and monthly copper data for the same period
(source, International Financial Statistics).10
8Removing the slow moving trend not only seems to improve the ﬁt but also is a key ingredient in designing
long run insurance and hedging contracts. Few investors/insurers are likely to be willing to hold long-term risk on a
variable that may turn out to be non-stationary.
9Strictly speaking the quantity exp
−
U t+1
t λ(xu)du is unobservable, since we cannot observe the continuous path of
copper, only discrete points. However, we can obtain copper data at reasonable high frequencies so that we can safely








10There is a caveat here. Our extended-sample starts from 1972, but all the years up to 1976 are part of a deep
26For estimation, we use a Bayesian approach that is suitable for the very few datapoints that
we have. Bayesian inference seems natural in this context, since it allows exact statements that
do not require asymptotic justiﬁcation. To estimate the parameters of interest (namely (α0,α 1))
we use a multimove Gibbs Sampler as described in Kim and Nelson (1998,1999) and is based on
the ﬁltering algorithm of Hamilton (1989). For details we refer the reader to these references. The
basic idea is to augment the parameter set by treating the unobserved states as parameters. Then
we ﬁx a draw from the posterior distribution of (µ0,µ 1,σ0,σ1,q,α 0,α 1) and conditional on these
parameters we draw from the posterior distribution of the states in a single step as described in
Kim and Nelson (1999). Given the draw from the posterior distribution of the states we sample
the conditional means µ0,µ 1 using a conjugate normal / truncated normal prior which leads to
a normal / truncated normal posterior.11 Conditional on the states and the draw from (µ0,µ 1)
se sample from the posterior distribution of (σ0,σ1) using inverse gamma priors which lead to
posteriors in the same class. Similarly, ﬁxing the states and the draw from (µ0,µ 1,σ0,σ1) we draw
q using a conjugate beta prior leading to conjugate beta posterior. The sampling of (α0,α 1)
presents the diﬃculty that there does not seem to be a natural conjugate prior to use and thus
we use a Metropolis Hastings-Random walk-accept-reject step where we sample from a bivariate
normal centered at the previous iterations’ estimate as described in Robert and Casella (1999).
This provides us with a new draw form (µ0,µ 1,σ0,σ1,q,α 0,α 1) and conditional on this new draw
we can iterate the algorithm by ﬁltering the states again, based on the new draw etc. It is then a
standard result in Bayesian computation that the stationary distribution of the parameters sampled
with these procedure (treating the unobserved states as parameters too) coincides with the posterior
distribution of the parameters.12
contraction due to political turmoil combined with extremely weak external conditions. However, since the extended-
sample starts during abnormal years these do not inﬂuence the estimation of λ(s) (which is estimated from the
transitions from normal to abnormal states). It is in this sense that the sample relevant for the estimation of the
latter starts in 1976. For details see below.
11For details see Albert and Chib (1993).
12To reduce computational time and satisfy the technical conditions required for the applicability of the Gibbs
Sampler, we used proper priors for (µ0,µ 1) and (α0,α 1) and improper priors for the rest of the parameters. The
proper prior for (µ0,µ 1) was Normal / Truncated normal with means (0,0) and a diagonal covariance matrix. The
standard deviations where chosen to be roughly 5 times the range of the sample, so that the priors had eﬀectively no
inﬂuence on the estimation. Similarly for (α0,α 1) we used independent normal priors centered at 0 with a standard
27A ﬁrst output of this procedure is Figure 2 which plots the probability of being in an abnormal
state.The model recognizes roughly three years out of the 24 as abnormal years: the early 1980s
and the recent episode following the Asian/Russian crises. The early 1980s episode corresponds to
a devastating debt-crisis, and was signiﬁcantly more severe than the recent one. In fact, the recent
episode appears to be a mix of a milder sudden stop and a precautionary recession.
An interesting observation about these probabilities is that they allow us to identify the abnor-
mal regimes with great conﬁdence. To improve the tightness of the posterior conﬁdence intervals




[χi log(p00(α0,α 1)) + (1 − χi)log(p01(α0,α 1))]
where χi takes the value 1 if there is no transition to state 1, and takes the value 0 otherwise. It is
interesting to notice that the likelihood for (α0,α 1) depends on the data only through the ﬁltered
states. In other words all other parameters of the model including the GDP-data are relevant for
our purpose of estimating (α0,α 1) only to the extent that they inﬂuence the identiﬁcation of the
states. In other words if we were to condition directly on the states we would be able to get rid of
the noise introduced by ﬁltering.
Given the few data points and the quite clear identiﬁcation of the abnormal states we report
directly the posterior distribution of (α0,α 1) conditional on the early 80’s and 1999 being the
abnormal states. we report the posterior distributions of the parameters (α0,α 1) conditional on
the states that are identiﬁed as abnormal.13 Table 1 reports these results.
Correspondingly, in what follows we use α0 =2 .5,α 1 =5 .2 as our benchmark values for the
function λ(s).
deviation of 10. Even when we experimented with more diﬀuse priors the algorithm produced virtually identical results
but computational time was signiﬁcantly increased, because convergence was signiﬁcantly slower. Most importantly
though, for the results that we report in Table 1 and that we use in the calibration exercise we used completely ﬂat
priors.
13I.e., states that have a posterior probability of being abnormal above 0.75. The conditioning is done in order to
increase the precision of the estimates and seems to be warranted just by a visual inspection of Figure 2.












Probability of abnormal regime
Figure 2: Probability of abnormal regime
Posterior Distributions
m e a n s t d . D e v i a t i o n1 02 55 07 59 0
α0 -2.522 1.067 -3.826 -3.027 -2.316 -1.789 -1.420
α1 -5.170 3.387 -9.259 -6.802 -4.708 -3.040 -1.515
Table 1: Posterior Distributions of the Parameters (α0,α 1) Conditional on the States that are
Identiﬁed as Abnormal. 10, 25 etc. refer to the respective quantiles.
295.1.2 Other parameters
We calibrate ζ and T to generate the average cumulative consumption drop caused by the sudden
stops in the sample, which is about 8-10% of GDP. One such conﬁguration is T =1and ζ =
egT +0 .35(erT − egT).
The parameters κ and γ are calibrated to generate reasonable amounts of steady-state debt
(and hence reasonable amounts of insurance needs) together with signiﬁcant precautionary ﬂuctu-
ations (see below, in particular, to explain much –but not all– of the precautionary contraction
experienced by Chile at the early stages of the 1998-9 episode). For this, we set κ =0 .8 and γ =7 .
The interest rate r i ss e tt o0 . 0 9t oc a p t u r et h eh i g hc o s to fb o r r o w i n gf a c e db yt h et y p i c a l
emerging market and the growth rate g is set to 0.03. The latter is a constant-rate approximation
to a path that grows signiﬁcantly faster than that level for a few years, while the country is catching
up, and then decelerates below that level forever. We normalize initial GDP (y0) to 1, and set the
initial debt-to-GDP ratio to 0.5 (i.e., X0 = −0.5).
Finally, we approximate the process for copper by a driftless Brownian motion with constant
volatility σ, which we estimate using monthly data from 1972 to 1999 (source, IFS). We ﬁnd a
value of roughly σ =0 .23 and normalize the initial value of s to 0.
5.2 Aggregate Hedging
Given these parameters, we now turn to a quantitative evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of the various
strategies described in Sections 3.2 and 4.
5.2.1 Precautionary Savings and Hedging
Let us illustrate the impact of the diﬀerent hedging strategies in steps: In the ﬁrst one we illustrate
the gains from going from a pure precautionary savings strategy to one that incorporates diﬀusion
risk hedging. In the second one we enrich the strategy further by adding jump risk hedging.
We start by drawing a random path for st, plotted in panel (a) of Figure 3. The path runs for
8y e a r sa n dno sudden stop takes place in it. The main features of this path are not too diﬀerent
from the realization of the price of copper during the 1990s. In particular, the large rise in s near
the middle of the path followed by a sharp decline toward the end of the period is reminiscent of
30the path of the price of copper in the second half of the 1990s. The path starts at s0 =0 , which
corresponds to the empirical mean of st in the data.
The two lines in subplot (b) illustrate the corresponding paths of (excess) consumption generated
for the precautionary savings only case (dashed line) and the diﬀusive risk hedging case (solid line).
The former tracks the signal closely while the latter manages to avoid precautionary contractions.
Note, however, that both paths have positive slope, reﬂecting precautionary savings against the
jump risk (both) and precautionary contractions risk (the case without diﬀusion hedging) .
Subplot (c) shows the the paths of the currents account deﬁcits do not diﬀer much in both
scenarios. In both cases the current account deﬁcit is “procyclical,” in the sense that as the signal
worsens the current account deﬁcit shrinks. Of course, in our context income does not change
w i t ht h es i g n a lb u tt h ep o i n tw ea r ei s o l a t i n gi st h es e n s i t i v i t yo fconsumption to news signifying
a tightening of credit conditions. The analysis would not be changed in any substantive way
by adding some correlation between such news and income shocks. We chose to keep income a
deterministic process, in order to illustrate in the simplest possible way that variations in the price
of exported commodities can have an eﬀect above and beyond their direct income eﬀect (which we
have eﬀectively “normalized” to 0 for simplicity), as long as they are useful in predicting the arrival
of sudden stops.
Importantly, the procyclical behavior of the current account deﬁcit does not reﬂect the same
behavior of consumption in the two scenarios.
In the absence of diﬀusion risk hedging, it is consumption that does the adjustment. Chile is
a point in case: When the price of copper collapsed at the end of the 1990s, Chile reduced rather
than increased its current account deﬁcit — exactly the opposite behavior of that of Australia, a
developed economy which was facing similar terms of trade shocks.14 Moreover, the sharp decline
in the current account deﬁcit from 6 to about 3.5 percent of GDP toward the end of the sample,
suggests that about half of the current account adjustment observed in Chile during the 1998-9
crisis can be accounted by optimal precautionary behavior in the absence of hedging.15
While the current account does follow a similar path when diﬀusive risk is hedged, the adjust-
14See Caballero, Cowan and Kearns (2005).
15The rest of the adjustment could be accounted for by excess adjustment (some have argued that the central bank
contracted monetary policy excessively during this episode) and by the partial sudden stop itself (the “sovereign”
spread tripled during this episode).
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Figure 3: Subplot (a) depicts the path of the state variable (normalized by its yearly standard deviation) as a
function of time. Subplot (b) depicts the path of excess consumption when income at time 0 is normalized to
1 and κ =0 .8. The solid line depicts the path of excess consumption when the country uses diﬀusive hedging.
T h ed a s h e dl i n ed e p i c t st h ep a t ho fe x c e s sc o n s u m p t i on when the country uses exclusively precautionary
savings exclusively. Subplot (c) plots the current account rXt−c∗
t +y∗
t for the same two scenarios. Subplot
(d) plots the path of the debt/gdp ratio for the two scenarios. Throughout the solid line refers to diﬀusive
hedging and the dashed line to precautionary savings.
32ment variable is not consumption but the net asset position. To see this note that the current
account is given by:
CAt = rXt − c∗
t + y∗
t
If this quantity remains practically unchanged across the two scenarios, it means that the
behavior of rXt−c∗
t is roughly similar across them. However, as we have seen already, the volatility
of c∗ is dramatically diﬀerent across the two alternatives. This must mean that the net asset position
Xt has to become more volatile as we move from the precautionary savings case to diﬀusive hedging.
Subplot (d) conﬁrms this conjecture. In the absence of hedging, the country’s net asset position Xt
is smooth, while it ﬂuctuates when the country is hedging. As the state variable deteriorates, the
debt to GDP ratio improves under hedging. Hence the increased volatility of the net asset position
is just a natural consequence of what hedging is meant to achieve in the ﬁrst place: Namely, to
transfer resources between states of the world where they are less needed to states of the world
where they are needed the most. As we increase hedging, a substantial portion of consumption
volatility is “absorbed” by the procyclical variability of the net asset position.
Let us now turn to the second step and add the possibility of jump risk hedging. As we showed in
Section 4, with full hedging possibilities excess consumption becomes constant prior to the sudden
stop. This means that the country insulates itself from the sudden stop signal – it uses jump risk
hedging to reduce the decline in consumption at the sudden stop, and diﬀusive hedging to oﬀset
ﬂuctuations in the price of jump risk hedging as the signal changes. The top left subplot in Figure
4 reproduces the signal path in the previous ﬁgure, while the top right subplot illustrates the paths
of the country’s net foreign liabilities: The solid line shows the path of debt/gdp which ﬂuctuates
with the signal as the price of jump-risk insurance ﬂuctuates. The important concept, however,
is the dashed line which corresponds to the debt/gdp ratio the country will have if a sudden stop
takes place. That it is, it includes the return from the jump-risk hedges. This dashed line is smooth
and trending as the frictionless model would.
The bottom plots show the gains from jump risk hedging over and above diﬀusive hedging at
the time of the sudden stop. To generate these panels we ran 500 simulations for ten years, and
kept only those that yielded a sudden stop during that interval. The left panel shows the histogram
of diﬀerence in consumption levels at the time of the sudden stop between the full hedging case
and the diﬀusive-hedging only case. The right panel does the same for the consumption drops at
33the time of the sudden stop. Both panels have the common message that the possibility of jump
risk hedging can signiﬁcantly improve the outcome during a sudden stop.
5.2.2 Welfare calculations
We now summarize the diﬀerent gains by evaluating the value functions of a country under diﬀerent
hedging scenarios. For this, let V H and V HH denote the value function of a country that has access
to markets for diﬀusive risk only and to diﬀusive and jump risk, respectively. As a benchmark, V
denotes the value function of a country that only accumulates savings without accessing hedging
markets of any kind. We now ask the question: How much resources would be required to
compensate a country for its lack of access to hedging possibilities? Formally, when contrasting
with the diﬀusive risk hedging only scenario, we solve for the amount W such that:
V H(st,X t,y∗
t)=V (st,X t + W, y∗
t) (46)








Then, using (17), (32), the deﬁnition of w and (46) yields:
dγ =( 1+w)bγ (48)
where b solves the diﬀerential equation (20) and d is determined as in sections 4.4 or 4.3 depending







from which we can determine W by using (47).
Figure 5 presents W (normalized by gdp), when the country is allowed to hedge diﬀusive risks
only, both diﬀusive and jump risks and when it is only allowed to accumulate precautionary savings.
(Clearly in the third case the welfare gain is zero by construction) Finally we also report the welfare
loss when the country ignores predictability altogether, as we described in section 3.3 and hence
adopts suboptimal precautionary savings.16
16To determine the constant hazard λ, we ran a simulation to determine the probability that the country enters
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Figure 4: The top left subplot is identical to the top left plot of ﬁgure 3. It depicts the path of the signal
normalized by its yearly standard deviation. The top right subplot depicts debt to GDP as a function of
time. The various lines capture the level of debt to GDP assuming the country were to go into a sudden
stop at time t. The bottom left ﬁgure depicts results from a simulation. Conditional on s0 =0 ,w ed r a w
500 paths for a duration of 10 years. Keeping those paths where the country enters in to a SS within 10
years the bottom left subplot shows the diﬀerences in the level of consumption at the time of the sudden
stop between the perfect hedging scenario and the diﬀusive hedging scenario. Similarly, the bottom right
ﬁgure shows the diﬀerences in consumption drop upon entering the sudden stop between the two scenarios.
35The ﬁgure shows that for a range of values of s corresponding to the range of the (log) price
of copper in our sample, the gains from hedging are substantial. Using hedging in place of pre-
cautionary savings typically results in values of W between 8 and 10% of GDP, if only “diﬀusive”
hedging is used and are potentially up to 18% when both “jump” and “diﬀusive” hedging is used.
To put this in perspective, notice that the debt/gdp ratio for the country under consideration is
50%. This implies that using hedging instead of precautionary savings is equivalent to reducing the
debt to GDP ratio of the country from 50% to a number between 32% and 40%.
Another important observation about the ﬁgure is that most of the beneﬁts of hedging accrue
for intermediate values of the state variable. As the state variable approaches ±∞ all hedging
strategies start becoming irrelevant. The reason is intuitive. If st →∞then the hazard rate goes
to 0 and the expected time to the next sudden stop approaches inﬁnity. Hence, the sudden stop is
“very far away”. Therefore any comparative beneﬁts of one strategy over the other get so heavily
discounted, that they become essentially 0. By a similar reasoning, as st →− ∞the sudden stop
becomes imminent (and insurance against it too expensive).
A reassuring feature of Figure 5 is that the welfare beneﬁts of only hedging diﬀusive risks is
signiﬁcant and covers more than half of the distance to perfect hedging, irrespective of the level
of the state variable. This suggests that the beneﬁts of hedging will accrue even when there is no
explicit insurance against jump risk. This is important since developing markets for jump (sudden
stop) risk is substantially harder than for diﬀusive risk, which are readily available in many cases.
Finally, note from the lowest line (with crosses) that ignoring hedging and the variability of
the sudden stop hazard –essentially accumulating precautionary savings at a constant rate– is
not too costly when the likelihood of a sudden stop is high as long as the country has the right
sense of the unconditional (on the signal) likelihood of a crisis: neither precautionary savings only
strategy is good at handling the sudden stop. However the cost of a non-contingent precautionary
savings strategy takes places during good times (high s), when the country overaccumulates costly
non-contingent resources when the low risk of a sudden stop does not justify it.
into a sudden stop in the next 10 years conditional on s0 =0 . We then determined the constant hazard rate λ so
that it will produce exactly the same probability.

















































Figure 5: Equivalent variation for a “typical” range of values of st (normalized by its yearly standard
deviation). For a precise deﬁnition of the notion of equivalent variation see the text.
375.2.3 Decomposing the Gains
Let us not decompose the gains from diﬀerent hedging strategies. Our model produces a clear
demarcation of time into three stages: Before a sudden stop, during a sudden stop, and after a
sudden stop. The marginal value of a dollar is highest during the sudden stop, somewhat lower in
the phase that precedes it and lowest in the post-sudden stop phase. Hence, a strategy produces
welfare gains if it manages to “shift” resources into the sudden stop and also into the phase before
the sudden stop.
Table 2 reports the results of a simple simulation exercise: We start with s0 =0 , and simulate
a number of paths for st for 10 years. We also simulate the arrival of sudden stops by drawing
independent exponential variables and using formula (11) to determine the time of arrival of sudden
stops. In about 67% of the simulated paths for st we observe a sudden stop within 10 years. We
then compute the behavior of c∗
t,X t along the path, consumption immediately following the sudden
stop c∗
τ+ and the associated consumption drop upon entering the sudden stop. Results are reported
for the four strategies of the previous section from worst to best: suboptimal precautionary savings,
optimal precautionary savings, diﬀusive hedging only, and perfect hedging. The ﬁrst column shows
initial (excess) consumption, which is highest for perfect hedging and second highest for diﬀusive
hedging. The reason for this is that perfect hedging does not require precautionary savings, while
that of diﬀusive hedging requires less precautionary savings than the other two. It is the next three
columns that capture the most important results, however. The second column shows the level of
consumption at the time of the sudden stop, with a clear advantage for the hedged strategies; the
third column shows that the drop of consumption at the time of the sudden stop is signiﬁcantly
lower in the case of diﬀusive and jump risk hedging. The reason why the diﬀerence in drops is
greater than that of levels at the time of sudden stop is important: In all but the full insurance
case, consumption rises over time as precautionary savings accumulate. But this also means that
in all the cases but the jump risk hedge case, the economy is relatively vulnerable if the sudden
stop happens in the near future, when the country has not had the time to accumulate resources.
This is reﬂected in the last column of the table, which shows the correlation between the time it
takes for the sudden stop to arrive and the level of consumption at the sudden stop. With jump
risk hedge, there is no correlation. With all the rest, this correlation is positive, although diﬀusive
hedging can also reduce it signiﬁcantly.
38c∗(0) mean c∗(τ+) mean ∆c∗
τ cov(c∗+
τ ,τ)
Suboptimal Precautionary Savings 19.99 12.00 9.39 0.99
Optimal Precautionary Savings 19.83 12.04 8.37 0.98
Only Diﬀusive hedging 20.24 12.66 9.00 0.67
Diﬀusive+Jump hedging 20.64 13.02 7.60 0
Table 2: Initial (excess) consumption c∗(0), (excess) consumption at the time of the sudden stop c∗
τ+,
standard deviation of the consumption path leading to the sudden stop (std(c∗
t)) and instantaneous
consumption drop upon entering the sudden stop (∆c∗
τ) for various hedging scenarios.
5.2.4 Introducing risk premia
Up to now we have assumed no risk-premia on either diﬀusive or jump risk hedging. In this section
we go to the opposite extreme and ask: how large would the risk premia have to be for the country
to give up hedging?
T h ef r a m e w o r kw ed e v e l o p e di nS e c t i o n6i sw e l ls u ited to answer this question. In particular,










Since d = b if p =0(no diﬀusive risk hedging) and I =0(no jump risk hedging) we can replace d
with the function b from Section 3.
Figure 6 reports the results when one computes the “critical risk premiums” φ1 and φ2 as
implied by the above formula, for the range of (log) price of copper observed in our sample. The
top panel shows that the critical risk premium for diﬀusive hedging is about 8%. The bottom panel
shows that the critical risk premium for jump risk hedging typically exceeds 100%. These large
critical premia conﬁrm the beneﬁts of hedging. For diﬀusive risks, which in many cases already
have up-and-running markets, 8% is very large when compared with reasonable premia in liquid





critical risk premium − diff hedging




























critical risk premium − jump hedging






















Figure 6: Critical Risk Premia for diﬀusive hedging and jump hedging. The top plot depicts
the critical risk premium φ1 = −γσ2 ds
d which would make it optimal to avoid diﬀusive hedging
altogether. The bottom line depicts φ2 = K
(rd)γ − 1, i.e. the percentage by which the true hazard
rate would have to be “over-estimated” by insurers in order to make jump hedging too expensive.
40markets.17 For jump risk hedging, a premium above 100% reﬂects the large potential gains of
developing such markets.
6 Sudden stops: Time variation in hazard rates and traded vari-
ables
In this section we argue that Chile is not an exception in terms of the usefulness of our analysis. For
this, we document two important ingredients for our framework: that there is a signiﬁcant element
of predictability in sudden stops, and that this predictability is correlated with readily available
and tradable indices which are largely beyond the control of individual emerging market economies
(hence moral hazard is of limited concern). Moreover, we conduct this analysis in a simple reduced
form framework, so that our conclusions here are not intertwined with our speciﬁc methodology in
the rest of the paper.
6.1 Time Variation and Predictability of the Likelihood of Sudden Stops
We identify the sudden stop hazard using the data and methodology from Calvo, Izquierdo and
Mejia (2004). They identify sudden stops based on a number of cutoﬀs and indicators, which they
then use to run (probit) regressions against country speciﬁc variables (dollarization, openness etc.)
and time eﬀects. Their data are yearly and span the period 1990-2001 for 32 countries, of which
15 are emerging markets (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey). We focus
exclusively on the 15 emerging markets.
We essentially replicate the Calvo et al steps by running logit and probit regressions of the form:
yit =P r ( SS =1 )=F(x0
itβ)
We use the most signiﬁcant variables reported in their paper, namely the degree of dollarization,
openness, and terms of trade, as well as time ﬁxed eﬀects. After running the regressions, we isolate
the predicted probabilities F(x0b β) and the actual regressor values x0b β.
17For example, the corresponding Sharpe ratio is 0.35 which is nearly twice the Sharpe ratio for the long sample
of the US stock market (see, e.g. Campbell and Cochrane (1999)).
41Assuming that the conditional probabilities F(x0b β) capture well the variation in the likelihood of
running into a sudden stop, we investigate whether there is signiﬁcant time variation in the hazard
rates. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show that indeed the bulk of the variation is in the within (across
time) dimension as opposed to the between (across country) variation. Also, the standard deviation
of 0.24 indicates that the conditional probabilities of sudden stops vary substantially across time.
Time variability in the conditional probabilities is however not synonymous with predictability.
If there is little or no serial correlation in the conditional probabilities, then there is little beneﬁt
from time varying precautionary accumulation of reserves, hedging etc. All these measures are
eﬀective if there is some persistence in the process that generates the conditional probabilities. The
next four rows in Table 3 report results from a dynamic panel data regression of the form:
yit = αi + β1yit−1 + β2yit−2 + εit
R o w s2a n d3a r es i m p l eﬁxed eﬀects regressions with robust standard errors. The next two rows
report the equivalent results when one uses the estimator of Arellano and Bond (1999), to avoid
the well known biases of dynamic panel data models. Uniformly, the results indicate substantial
persistence and hence predictability of the conditional probabilities.
6.2 Traded Variables and the variation of the conditional likelihood of Sudden
Stops
Sofar we have only examined whether there appears to be enough variation and persistence in the
conditional probability of sudden stops to justify time varying precautionary measures. A separate
question is whether traded instruments can be used to hedge away these risks. One way to answer
this question is to investigate whether there exist traded instruments that can “predict” the time
variation in the conditional probabilities. Table 4 addresses this question.
We use HYt−1 to denote the diﬀerence between Aaa and Baa bonds (high yield spread) as
reported in the historical series H.15 of the Federal Reserve. Columns (1) and (2) use the predicted
values x0b β and F(x0b β) obtained using a probit model similar to Calvo et al. (2004) to run the
regressions:
42Logit Probit Logit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Between /Within 0.06/0.24 0.07/0.23
Prob (Lag1) 0.51 0.53
(5.32)** (5.45)**
Prob (Lag2) -0.48 -0.48
(-5.89)** (-5.89)**
Prob (Lag1) Arellano -Bond 0.46 0.46
(4.64)** (4.65)**
Prob (Lag2) Arellano - Bond -0.67 -0.68
(-5.12)** (-5.30)**
R-squared 0.37 0.37
Table 3: Columns (1) and (2): Ratio of variation (reported as ratio of standard deviations) attribut-
able to the within (accross time) dimension as opposed to the between (accross panel) dimension.
Columns (3) and (4): Regressions of predicted probabilities on their lagged values using regular
regession and the Arellano-Bond estimator.
43(1) (2) (3) (4)
D.regressors D.lprob D.regressors D.lprob
L.HY -16.90 -83.30 -71.62 -70.20
(-4.54)** (-4.30)** (-4.53)** (-4.40)**
Observations 135 135 135 135
R - s q u a r e d0 . 2 00 . 1 70 . 1 90 . 1 9
Table 4: Column (1): Regressions of ﬁrst diﬀerences in the regressors x0
itβ used in Calvo et al.
(2004) on the lagged diﬀerence between Baa and Aaa bonds (L.HY ) .C o l u m n( 2 )S a m ea sc o l u m n
(1) with the sole exception that we use diﬀerences in the (log) predicted probability log.F(x0
itβ)
in place of x0
itβ. Columns (3)-(4): Same as columns (1)-(2) using a logit instead of a probit model.
For all regressions we use panel corrected standard errors allowing for heteroskedasticity and con-
temporaneous correlation across panels. A constant is included but not reported.
∆(x0
itb β)=α0 + α1HYt−1 + εit
∆log(F(x0
itb β)) = α0 + α1HYt−1 + εit
The ﬁrst regression is a projection of the change in the regressors entering the probit model of
Calvo et. al. (2004) on the high yield spread at t − 1. The second regression performs a similar
exercise for the predicted probabilities. If, for instance, increases in the high yield spread coincide
with periods of high risk and risk aversion, then emerging markets might be exposed to contagion
risk. Hence, in a manner similar to copper for Chile, variations in the HY c a nb eu s e dt of o r ma
hedging strategy.
As Table 4 shows, the R-squared of these regressions is close to 20%. Hence, 20% of the inno-
vations in the conditional probabilities are predicted by a variable that belongs to the information
set of agents at time t−1 and has a liquid market. To put this in perspective, in Table 3 the total
predictable variation in the conditional probabilities was about 37% of their variation in the sample.
Comparing the two numbers reveals a substantial co-variation between the predicted hazard and
HYt−1.
Note that the coeﬃcient has the expected sign since HY is mean reverting, thus a high degree
44of HY today predicts a lower HY tomorrow and hence a lower likelihood of a sudden stop. To see
this point more clearly, suppose that there is positive contemporaneous correlation between ∆x0
itb β
and ∆HYt, i.e. suppose that:
E(∆x0
itb β)=α0 + e α1E(∆HYt) with e α1 > 0 (49)
Now assume that HYt is a simple AR(1) process:
HYt = ρHYt−1 + εV,t with ρ<1
so that:
∆HYt = HYt − HYt−1 =( ρ − 1)HYt−1 + εV,t
and also:
E (∆HYt)=( ρ − 1)HYt−1 (50)
Plugging (50) into (49) shows that:
E(∆x0
itb β)=α0 + e α1(ρ − 1)HYt−1
Hence the regressions in Table 4 produce a negative sign on lagged HY since e α1(ρ − 1) < 0.
T h em a i nr e a s o nw h yHY performs well in terms of predictive power is that it captures well the
common variation of the arrival of sudden stops across countries. To illustrate this, we computed
the average yearly diﬀerence in the probability of a sudden stop as implied by the probit model.
Then we plotted the (negative of) the high yield (lagged once) against it. Figure 7 illustrates the
strong comovement between the two series.
7F i n a l R e m a r k s
In this paper we characterized several aspects of sudden stops, precautionary contractions, and
the corresponding aggregate hedging strategies. For this, we built a model simple enough to shed
analytical light on some of the key issues but realistic enough to provide some quantitative guidance.
We showed that even after removing all other sources of uncertainty, the optimal path of aggre-
gate demand in an unhedged emerging market economy exhibits large precautionary contractions.
That is contractions that precede sudden stops. We then argued that smooth diﬀusive hedging could
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Figure 7: The joint variation in the average yearly diﬀerence in the probability of a sudden stop
(D_probs) as implied by a probit model and the (negative of) the high yield spread (lagged once)
(neg_l_hy).
46The gains from these hedging strategies are large, which raises the question of why aren’t
countries already doing this in a signiﬁcant manner. Our somewhat informed belief is that the
problem is mostly one of coordination, which could be reduced signiﬁcantly with the involvement
of the international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs).
On one end, hedging along the lines we have suggested is not standard practice for external
liability management: Any sensible policymaker knows that the political (and personal) cost of
something going wrong while implementing an unorthodox strategy is many times larger than that
of failing while following the standard recipe. The IFIs can help by modernizing their advice on
standard practices.
On the other, while one can imagine many indicators that could be used to start improving
hedging strategies immediately, such as the price of commodities, the high yield spread (HY), the
volatility index (VIX), indicators of US and other developed regions activity, and so on, some of
these markets are not nearly as large as they would need to be (recall that the issue is not to
hedge the income eﬀect of commodity price ﬂuctuations but the sudden stop, which is signiﬁcantly
lager, and probably not just as a multiplier but also as a bellwether). Market creation requires
coordination, and the development of a few general indices that can ensure adequate liquidity.
Again, the IFIs can help develop these markets. For example, the IMF could modify its contingent
credit lines to index them to indicators that could eventually be adopted by the private sector and
traded in open markets.
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50AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proofs for section 2.2
Proof. (Lemma 1) Since we made the simplifying assumption that the country suﬀers only one





















This problem has the trivial solution:
c∗
t = rWe
2 τ + T<t<∞ (53)
with
We





This constant can be interpreted as the “excess” wealth at date τ +T (that is, the wealth in excess
of that which is needed to cover the reservation-consumption level κyt). During the sudden stop
(τ ≤ t ≤ τ + T) we can use the continuation value function, V (Xτ+T,y∗
τ+T),f r o ma b o v e ,t ow r i t e





















te−r(t−τ) dt − e−rTXτ+T














by (5). Since the country is growing and wishes to expand its consumption at a faster rate than the
constraint allows, it can be easily shown18 that the sudden stop constraint, (55), is always binding
Xτ+T = Xτ+T. (56)
18For details see Caballero and Panageas (2003)
51Given this result, the optimization problem is straightforward. It is a deterministic consumption




1 − e−rT We
1,τ < t < τ + T (57)
with
We





It is easy to see from these expressions that as Xτ+T rises, c∗
t falls. The country has to cut back
consumption during the crisis in order to satisfy a tighter sudden-stop constraint. We are now ready


















































τ) denotes the value function in the absence of a sudden-stop constraint and K is
the constant given in the statement of the proposition. K>1 is a straightforward consequence of
the fact that the value function (which is negative if γ>1) has to be lower than the value function
in the absence of the constraint (55) A simple diﬀerentiation shows that Kζ > 0 as long as γ>1.
A.2 Proofs for section 3.1
Proof. (Lemma 2) We give a brief sketch of the proof. Diﬀerentiate the left hand side of (18) with
respect to b to obtain:








52since γ>1. Moreover, at b = 1
r the left hand side of (18) is greater than 0 while at b = b it is less
than 0. This establishes existence and uniqueness of the solution to (18) by the intermediate value
Theorem.
A.3 Propositions and Proofs for section 3.2
Proposition 5 If there exists a function b(s) solving (20) subject to (21) and (22) then (17) solves



















Proof. Substituting (17) into (15) and performing some obvious simpliﬁcations leads to (20).
The reason why b(st) has to satisfy the boundary conditions (21) and (22) follows from the next
proposition (proposition 6). Since (17) satisﬁes (15) for b(st) solving (20), a classical veriﬁcation
theorem can be invoked to show that it must be the value function as long as the “tail” condition
(61) is satisﬁed (Fleming and Soner (1993) p.172).
The above proposition is a “place-holder” for all the properties that need to be veriﬁed in order
to establish that (17) is the value function of the problem. We start by showing that the boundaries
to b are given by (21) and (22).































Proof. We focus on the γ>1 case. The proof proceeds in two steps. First one obtains an
upper bound on the value function of the problem with sudden stops, which in this case is naturally













53It tuns out that this expression is also a lower bound to the value function when st goes to inﬁnity.
The lower bound is established upon observing that the consumption policy in the absence of
sudden stops c∗NSS
t , 0 <t<τis still a feasible consumption /portfolio plan in the presence of
sudden stops (since it satisﬁes the intertemporal budget constraint and also Xt > −
y∗
t
r−g for all t ).






























However by standard arguments it is easy to show that the right hand side of the above equation























































Since the upper and the lower bound coincide to V NSS as s →∞ , the claim is established. A
similar claim can be used to show the second result in the proposition.
Showing formally that b(st) possesses a unique solution subject to the two boundary conditions
(21) and (22) is a fairly hard mathematical task that is well beyond the scope of the present paper.
The next Proposition provides a sketch of how one would proceed to obtain a proof. For the
substantive results of the paper, we were always able to obtain numericall yas o l u t i o nt ot h i sO D E
at arbitrary precision levels.
Proposition 7 There exists a solution to the ODE (20) subject to (21) and (22).
Proof. (Sketch) First we transform the second order ODE into a system of ODE’s. Then
we compute the steady states at s =+ ∞ and s = −∞, linearize the system and compute its
eigenvalues. Using the stable manifold theorem around s =0twice (as s → +∞ and as s →− ∞ )
establishes the result. For more details see Caballero and Panageas (2003) Proposition 3.
54The last step in order to verify that (17) is indeed the Value function is to verify (61). To show
(61) we need two Lemmas:









,K −1/γr ≤ A(st) ≤ r ∀st ∈ (−∞,+∞)
Then Xt ≥ XNSS
t , where XNSS
t is the asset process that results when one uses the optimal










Proof. This result is trivial. One solves for the asset process that results from the two policies
to ﬁnd that
XNSS














= −(r − A(st))e−(rt−
U t













Now integrating both sides and rearranging gives:























The result now follows since A(st) ≤ r ∀st ∈ (−∞,+∞).
Lemma 5 The function b(s) is bounded between 1
rK1/γ and 1
r.
Proof. We will derive the result by means of a contradiction. Suppose b(s) solves (20) subject
to the boundary conditions (21),(22). Since b(s) asymptotes to 1
r as s →∞and to b as s →− ∞
this means that if there exists a b> bthen there must be a s∗ such that b(s∗) >b and b(s∗) is a
local max. Similarly if there exists a b<1
r then there must be a s∗ such that b(s∗) < 1
r is a local
55min. Both are impossible though. We establish the ﬁrst contradiction. The second is obtained
















which in turn implies that bss(s∗) > 0 since the left hand side of the above equation is negative.
Hence every extremum in the area b(s∗) >bmust be a local minimum, and cannot be a maximum.
Similarly if b(s∗) < 1
r, a symmetric argument can be used, to show that is impossible to have a
local min in this region.




¢γ ≤ b(st)γ ≤ K
¡1
r




















































































1−γ is a negative
number. The second from the previous lemma and the monotonicity of the value function and




























irrespective of t,s i n c eγ>1. Hence, it must be the case that (63) holds.
56A.4 Proofs for section 4
For all the value functions in this section one can apply similar veriﬁcation arguments to the ones
given in the previous section. Hence, we just focus on the substantive proofs of the Lemmas and
the Propositions in the text.






































































The claim now follows directly after some obvious cancellations












Notice also that for φ1 = φ2 =0 , equation (36) becomes:










































{id − id}dt =0
57Proof. (Proposition 2) Similar to Propositions 3 and 4 (see below)





Then the Bellman equation (36) becomes:




















































Proof. (Proposition 4) Using (44) and (45) the Bellman equation (36) becomes:




















The result then follows upon using Lemma 3.
58